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ABSTRACT 
Flooding remains a major problem for the United States, causing numerous deaths and damaging 
countless properties. To reduce the impact of flooding on communities, the U.S. government 
established the Community Rating System (CRS) in 1990 to reduce flood damages by 
incentivizing communities to engage in flood risk management initiatives that surpass those 
required by the National Flood Insurance Program. In return, communities enjoy discounted 
flood insurance premiums. Despite the fact that the CRS raises concerns about the potential for 
unevenly distributed impacts across different income groups, no study has examined the equity 
implications of the CRS. This study thus investigates the possibility of unintended consequences 
of the CRS by answering the question: What is the effect of the CRS on poverty and income 
inequality? Understanding the impacts of the CRS on poverty and income inequality is useful in 
fully assessing the unintended consequences of the CRS. The study estimates four fixed-effects 
regression models using a panel dataset of neighborhood-level observations from 1970 to 2010. 
The results indicate that median incomes are lower in CRS communities, but rise in floodplains. 
Also, the CRS attracts poor residents, but relocates them away from floodplains. Additionally, 
the CRS attracts top earners, including in floodplains. Finally, the CRS encourages income 
inequality, but discourages income inequality in floodplains. A better understanding of these 
unintended consequences of the CRS on poverty and income inequality can help to improve the 
design and performance of the CRS, and ultimately, increase community resilience to flood 
disasters. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Flooding has and continues to be a major problem for the United States, causing 
numerous deaths and damaging countless properties.(1,2) According to the National Weather 
Service,(3) from 1982 to 2011, the average annual flood-related deaths and flood damage in the 
United States were 95 fatalities and $8.20 billion, respectively. To reduce the risk and impact of 
flooding on communities, the United States government established the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) in 1968. Despite the creation of the NFIP, flooding still posed a major risk to 
communities. As a result, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) implemented 
the Community Rating System (CRS) in 1990. The CRS is a voluntary program that aims to 
further reduce risk exposure and flood damages by incentivizing communities to engage in flood 
risk management initiatives that surpass those required by the NFIP. In return, communities 
enjoy discounted flood insurance premiums.(4) There are 19 creditable CRS activities such as 
floodplain management and planning that focus on helping communities to manage their flood 
risks. Through this activity, a community might develop ordinances that prevent the construction 
of buildings in floodplains. In so doing, the community is able to reduce its flood risk and flood-
related damages.  
Despite the recent increase in policy priority for equity engendered by a persistent 
increase in income inequality,(5) policy analyses, including those examining the CRS, a flood risk 
management program (e.g., Brody et al.(6); Fan and Davlasheridze(7); Sadiq and Noonan(2,8)), 
often overlook the equity implications of the program. Moreover, for policies aiming at 
protecting vulnerable populations (e.g., by reducing risk exposure) and improving infrastructure, 
apprehensions about the distributional impacts are paramount.(9) Indeed, the establishment of the 
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CRS raises concerns about the potential for unevenly distributed impacts across different income 
groups in communities—leading to equity concerns (e.g., the scoring and allocation of 
discounted flood insurance premiums).(10,11)  Understanding the equity implications of risk 
management programs such as the CRS are important because minorities, and poor and rich 
people analyze risk differently.(12,13) Without considering such differences in risk analysis, well-
meaning risk management programs may not achieve their programmatic goals, and may even 
lead to unintended consequences that might exacerbate poverty and inequality. In short, if we 
care about keeping inequality low and reducing poverty, it is important to understand the equity 
implications of risk management programs such as the CRS.  
This study thus investigates the possibility of unintended consequences such as concerns 
over the fairness of the CRS by answering the following research question: What is the effect of 
the CRS on local poverty and income inequality? One mechanism through which the CRS could 
lead to inequities is by reallocating local migration of households at the bottom, middle, and the 
top of the income distribution. Moreover, discounted flood insurance premiums and building 
regulations likely have differential effects across the income distribution. Hence, we test whether 
participation in the CRS program will have implications for community-level poverty and 
income inequality. Our analysis also examines the impacts of high-risk areas and floodplains 
within CRS communities on poverty and income inequality. 
This study argues that in order to improve the effectiveness of the CRS, especially its 
flood risk management component, there needs to be an evaluation of the unanticipated 
consequences of the CRS. By understanding such unexpected consequences such as on poverty 
and income inequality, the overall performance of the CRS, and in particular, its flood risk 
management component could be improved. In addition, this study would help the risk analysis 
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community to better understand the relationship between risk and poverty as well as the role of 
risk analysis in addressing poverty.(14,15) Finally, our study addresses the deficit in equity-
centered empirical research such as the environmental justice literature, where correlations are 
typically identified rather than policy impacts.(16,17) 
To explore the relationship between poverty and income inequality and the CRS, we 
estimate panel regression models for a national dataset of neighborhood-level observations from 
1970 to 2010. The results provide important information on the impacts of the CRS on poverty 
and income inequality; information that academics, policymakers, CRS evaluators, and other 
stakeholders can utilize to develop a holistic understanding of the overall impacts of the CRS on 
participating local communities. In the following sections, we provide background information 
on the CRS and review relevant literature. Then, our methodology is outlined, including the data 
and variables. Next, the results are presented and discussed. Finally, the paper concludes by 
offering suggestions for future research opportunities on the impacts of the CRS on community-
level outcomes.  
2. BACKGROUND ON THE CRS 
 
To reduce the impact of flooding on communities, the United States government 
established the NFIP in 1968. The purpose of the NFIP—both then and now—is to reduce the 
impact of flooding on public and private infrastructures, provide affordable insurance to property 
owners, and promote the development of flood protection activities in communities throughout 
the United States.(19) The NFIP is a voluntary initiative between federal and state governments, 
private insurance companies, and local communities with a mission of reducing flood disasters 
by enacting and enforcing floodplain management activities in flood-prone areas.(19) Despite the 
creation of the NFIP, flooding still poses a major risk to communities. As a result, FEMA 
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implemented the CRS in 1990 as a voluntary program designed to incentivize communities to 
surpass the expectations of the NFIP. The three goals of the CRS are to reduce flood damage to 
insurable property, strengthen and support the insurance aspects of the NFIP, and foster 
comprehensive floodplain management.(18) When communities develop flood management 
activities that reflect these three goals, they enjoy discounted flood insurance premiums 
commensurate with their CRS class, which ranges from Class 10 to Class 1.(4,18) Class 10 
represents communities that do not participate or do not possess the minimum number of credit 
points to enter the program. As such, they receive no discount on flood insurance premiums. 
Class 1 represents communities with exceptional floodplain management activities who enjoy a 
45% discount on flood insurance premiums as long as they are located in a Special Flood Hazard 
Area (SFHA) (see Table I). SFHA refers to a land area with a 1% or greater chance of flooding 
within any given year. Communities located outside of a SFHA only receive a discount of up to 
10%. These rankings are based on the number of credit points a community has earned that range 
from 0-500—a Class 10 community—to 4,500(+)—a Class 1 community.  
 
Table I. CRS Classes, Credit Points, and Premium Discounts Based on Location in or outside a 
SFHA. 
CRS Class Credit Points Premium Reduction 
In SFHA (%) Outside SFHA (%) 
1 4,500+ 45 10 
2 4,000-4,999 40 10 
3 3,500-3,999 35 10 
4 3,000-3,499 30 10 
5 2,500-2,999 25 10 
6 2,000-2,499 20 10 
7 1,500-1,999 15 5 
8 1,000-1,499 10 5 
9 500-999 5 5 
10 0-499 0 0 
Source: FEMA(18).  
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Credit points are given to communities as they implement any of the 19 creditable 
activities that advance the CRS’s goals and span across one of the four categories: public 
information, mapping and regulations, flood damage reduction, and warning and response (see 
Table II).(18) Activities that promote public information include advising individuals about flood 
hazards and encouraging property owners to purchase flood insurance. Mapping and regulation 
activities center on preserving open spaces, protecting natural floodplain measures, enforcing 
standards, and managing stormwater. Credit points are also awarded to communities that endorse 
flood damage reduction activities such as creating a comprehensive floodplain management plan, 
relocating or retrofitting structures, and maintaining drainage systems, which help prevent 
repetitive losses.(20) Lastly, communities receive points for implementing measures that protect 
life and property in the event of a flood disaster through warning and response programs. The 
amount of credit points given to communities varies by the mitigation activity in each 
category.(10) Although the CRS attempts to identify a comprehensive list of credited activities, it 
recognizes that communities might engage in alternative approaches. These instances are 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis by an Insurance Services Office (ISO) specialist who also 
administers the day-to-day operations of the CRS program on behalf of FEMA, and assists 
communities in the CRS application process.  
Table II. Credit Points Awarded for CRS Activities. 
Activity Maximum Possible 
Points 
Percent of Communities 
Credited* 
300 Public Information Activities  % 
   310 Elevation Certificates 116 100 
   320 Map Information Service 90 93 
   330 Outreach Projects 350 89 
   340 Hazard Disclosure 80 71 
   350 Flood Protection Information 125 92 
   360 Flood Protection Assistance 110 41 
   370 Flood Insurance Promotion 110 0 
400 Mapping and Regulations   
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   410 Floodplain Mapping 802 50 
   420 Open Space Preservation 2,020 70 
   430 Higher Regulatory Standards 2,042 99 
   440 Flood Data Maintenance 222 89 
   450 Stormwater Management 755 84 
500 Flood Damage Reduction 
Activities 
  
   510 Floodplain Mgmt. Planning 622 46 
   520 Acquisition and Relocation 2,250 24 
   530 Flood Protection 1,600 12 
   540 Drainage System Maintenance 570 77 
600 Warning and Response   
   610 Flood Warning and Response 395 37 
   620 Levees 235 0 
   630 Dams 160 0 
Source: FEMA(18).  
 Participating in the CRS program is at no cost to communities, and communities can stop 
participating at any time. However, if communities decide to participate in the CRS program, 
they must recertify every year. Based on this recertification, communities who are adding 
additional credited activities can advance to a higher ranking. On the other hand, communities 
who are not properly or fully implementing credited activities may downgrade to a lesser 
ranking. Yet, regardless of a community’s ranking, the benefits of participating in the CRS can 
be enticing for communities who are exceedingly vulnerable to flood disasters. One benefit of 
participation is the reduction in flood insurance premiums for private property owners located in 
SFHAs.(18) However, participation can also yield benefits that are not as easily captured in 
monetary terms.(14) The continued implementation of robust flood protection measures, for 
example, that can reduce the extent of damage to property and infrastructure, as well as minimize 
economic disruptions and reduce human suffering is arguably the most significant long-term 
benefit of participating in the CRS. Other benefits of participation that accrue more broadly 
include reduced flood risks, better information about flood risks, and better infrastructure for 
managing floods and responding to flood events. Participation may also result in stricter building 
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codes and new land use rules.  While some of these benefits are concentrated to SFHA 
communities, others are more proportional to local flood risks, and some are more diffused to the 
broader area. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
3.1. Flood Hazards and Income 
There is a robust literature on learning and adapting to flood hazards, although these 
either do not focus on income(21,22) or do not observe a significant explanatory role for income.(23) 
The related literature on the demand for flood insurance has found a positive effect on income on 
the likelihood of insuring.(24,25) A sizeable literature examines the property price variation 
associated with flood risk, flood information and experiences, and insurance policies.(26-28)  As is 
common for property price hedonic studies, however, income is rarely explicitly considered.  
The mixed evidence of price differentials related to flood risk can partly be explained by 
different property types,(29) suggesting that information and incentives may differ substantially 
across income classes. 
The connection between income and willingness to reduce flood risk exposure has been 
studied in several ways.  Sekulova and van den Bergh(30) use survey data to find persistent 
negative effects of flooding on life satisfaction, effects that are irrespective of individuals’ 
income.  At a macro-level, Grames et al.(31) offer insights into how persistent flood risk can 
support multiple equilibria that sustain either a rich economy that invests in flood protection or a 
poor economy that consumes more and accumulates less capital to wash away.  Daniel et al.(32) 
estimate a willingness-to-pay for risk reduction and observe that it is somewhat lower where 
income is greater.  A common feature in this literature is that flood risk exposure is frequently 
correlated with other amenities, like recreational access, and demand for those amenities also 
generally depends on income.(33)  Cordes and Yezer(34) show how rising income has increased 
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development in risky coastal areas.  Combining that finding with policies that subsidize rather 
than reduce risk suggests that wealthier homeowners may be disproportionately benefiting from 
those subsidies.   
3.2. Community-Scale Flood Management, Flood Mitigation, and Income 
Income has been positively linked with individuals’ propensity to mitigate.(35,36) The role 
of income on collective, rather than private, flood mitigation activities, however, may be quite 
different.  For instance, wealthier residents may free-ride more on collective flood mitigation 
efforts.(37)  Nonetheless, community wealth may affect capacity to undertake public infrastructure 
investments (e.g., Sadiq and Noonan(8)) or access to national relief programs.  Wealthier counties 
tend to attract more ex-ante FEMA disaster mitigation spending (e.g., mitigation planning, 
structural projects) as well as ex-post disaster relief.(38) The effects of mitigation and relief, in 
turn, on changes in wealth and poverty remain less well identified.  Bagstad et al.(39) examine a 
set of policies, including some that promote local flood mitigation and management, and assess 
their distributional effects and influence on income inequality in the U.S. Gulf Coast.  Their 
concern with perverse subsidies includes a concern that policies subsidizing floodplain 
development can increase transfers to the powerful and wealthy, although some mitigation 
programs (such as those in the CRS) can have positive effects by reducing taxpayer burdens for 
flood relief. 
3.3. CRS Literature: What is Missing? 
Researchers have studied various aspects of the CRS, focusing largely on the 
determinants of community participation,(2,20) adaptive capacity,(40) policy learning,(6) the non-
linear incentive structure of the CRS,(8) the effects of the CRS on flood insurance demand,(10,19) 
and flood insurance claims.(41) Most recently, Fan and Davlasheridze(7) examined heterogeneity 
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in demand for CRS activities by demographic groups, confirming differential responses to flood 
mitigation efforts. Although these and other CRS-based studies may provide valuable 
information about the consequences of the CRS on communities, there is a need to investigate 
the unintended consequences of the CRS such as concerns over the fairness of the CRS (e.g., the 
scoring and allocation of discounted flood insurance premiums).(10) It is important to note that 
while researchers have examined the income distributional effects of the NFIP,(11,42)  the impacts 
of the CRS on poverty and income inequality is yet to be studied. 
3.4. Determinants of Poverty 
The problem of poverty remains a major challenge for researchers and policymakers(43) 
despite the myriad studies conducted to understand the antecedents of poverty.(42-45) Rather than 
review all the extensive work on the antecedents of poverty at the community level, we review 
the literature on the relationship between poverty and the control variables relevant to this 
analysis: housing value, vacancy rates, population density, non-migrants, unemployment, renters, 
and property damage. 
3.4.1. Housing Value  
 
A majority of the studies examining the relationship between housing values and poverty 
have done so with a racial minority focus. Pandey and Coulton,(46) for example, explored racial 
changes in neighborhoods in Cleveland, Ohio to assess the factors influencing neighborhoods’ 
poverty rates and social conditions. Upon analyzing 185 census tracts in Cleveland, the findings 
revealed a negative relationship between geographic concentrations of poverty and housing 
values. This negative relationship is conceivable because foreclosures, bankruptcies, and equity 
losses can lead to lower housing values, thus attracting poor people due to affordability.  
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3.4.2. Vacancy Rates 
 
The proportion of vacant homes in a community can have adverse effects on its economy, 
and subsequently, on its level of poverty.(47) The presence of a high percentage of vacant homes 
in a community may be an indication of a lack of economic opportunity in that community, 
which can exacerbate its poverty level.(44) Furthermore, vacant homes can reduce property 
values, and lead to lower rent, which would ultimately increase the number of poor people 
moving into such neighborhoods. 
 
3.4.3. Population Density  
  
Impoverished areas tend to be concentrated to specific counties, neighborhoods, and 
regions.(48) Historically, rural areas have observed higher poverty rates compared to urban 
areas.(48) Hirschl and Rank(26) explored the effect of population density on welfare participation 
in rural and urban counties in the United States. The findings revealed that despite the fact that 
rural counties have higher poverty rates, they are less likely to participate in welfare programs. 
However, in assessing urban poverty, Cohen(50) suggests that despite a high and persistent 
poverty rate, individuals living in densely populated areas typically have better access to public 
services to include education, healthcare, water, and electricity. In sum, population density may 
influence poverty rates; however the relationship may be nonlinear.  
3.4.4. Non-migrants 
 
A limited number of studies have explored the relationship between the proportion of a 
migrating population and poverty rates. Rupasingha and Goetz (43) found a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between non-migrants (i.e., percent of population that did not 
move within last five years) and poverty rates among a sample of 3,047 counties in the United 
States. In short, the frequency with which residents migrate in a community is closely related to 
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poverty rates, given the importance of location and development decisions in flood management, 
particularly important in this analysis. 
3.4.5. Unemployment  
 
The literature on the relationship between poverty and unemployment rate (the 
percentage of the work force that is currently not working)(51) has generally been positive. 
Blank,(52) for example, assessed the factors influencing poverty rates from 1960 to 1998. The 
findings revealed a significant and positive relationship between unemployment and poverty 
rates during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s. During the 1980s, however, the findings showed a 
negative relationship between unemployment and poverty. Similar results were found by 
Hoynes, Page, and Stevens(53) who explored the predictors of poverty from 1967 to 2003. The 
findings revealed that a 1% increase in unemployment resulted in a 0.5% increase in the poverty 
rate. Finally, McKernan and Ratcliffe(45) studied events that trigger entry into and exit from 
poverty. They found, among other results, that job loss by household members is an important 
factor.(45) 
3.4.6. Renters 
 
Scholars have consistently found that renters are more likely to experience poverty than 
homeowners. Caner and Wolff,(54) for instance, explored assets-based poverty in the United 
States and found that the assets-based poverty rate for homeowners was approximately 27% 
while the assets-based poverty rate for renters was nearly 67%. Haveman and Wolff(55) found 
similar results in their study of assets-based poverty in the United States. The findings revealed 
that assets-based poverty for renters increased from 52% in 1983 to 64% in 2001 and assets-
based poverty for homeowners only increased from 4% in 1983 to 6% in 2001. Instead of 
exploring assets-based poverty, Kutty(56) explored housing-induced poverty, which refers to a 
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situation where a household cannot afford basic necessities (e.g., food and clothing) after paying 
for their housing. Using data provided from the 1999 American Housing Survey, Kutty(56) found 
that nearly 50% of renters were not officially in poverty, but were experiencing housing-induced 
poverty.  
3.4.7. Flood-related Property Damage  
 
The literature on the relationship between property damage from natural disasters and 
poverty has been studied on a national and international scale. Nationally, Yoon(57) assessed the 
relationship between social vulnerability and disaster damages among counties along the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Atlantic coast. The findings revealed that counties with higher social 
vulnerability in regards to poverty, unemployment, education, occupation, and resource 
availability experienced greater property damages from natural disasters. In fact, poverty was 
found to be the most powerful predictor of property damage.(57) Internationally,  
Brouwer et al.(58) surveyed nearly 700 floodplain residents in Bangladesh to explore the 
relationship between risk, poverty, and vulnerability. The authors posited that floodplain 
residents living below the poverty threshold will suffer more from being exposed to 
environmental hazards compared to those living above the poverty threshold. Upon analyzing 
average flood damage as a share of household income, the findings revealed that those living 
below the poverty threshold experienced greater disaster damages. Similarly, Kahn(59) found that 
poorer individuals face greater exposure to and damage from natural disasters as they are more 
likely to live in hazardous areas.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
We analyze the effects of CRS participation on neighborhood-level dynamics, focusing in 
particular on local income distribution and poverty rates. Our primary attention is on measuring 
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the impact of the CRS on the lower end of the income distribution, operationalized here as the 
poverty rate. The empirical analysis also examines the rest of the income distribution such as 
median income levels, the share of the population in the top percentile of income, and a GINI 
coefficient to characterize the variation in local income.  
The regression model explains variations in local income distribution over time with 
participation in the CRS and a variety of controls that may directly affect local income dynamics 
as well as the likelihood of participating. Further, by examining units of observation at much 
smaller spatial scales than the community or local government that opts to participate, the model 
can identify CRS impacts both within-neighborhood income distributions and across-
neighborhood income distributions. Given that underlying flood risk varies greatly within 
communities, just as income does, examining how participation at the community level affects 
the joint distribution of risk and income sheds light on important equity implications of the 
program. 
4.1. Data 
In order to assess the impact of the CRS and flood risk on poverty and income inequality, 
we merged five different data sources together (see Table III). The first data source is CRS 
participation from 1998 to 2013. These data contain basic information about participating 
communities such as the name of the county or place, its state, total CRS points, CRS class, and 
points awarded for each of the 18 creditable activities (excluding 370, Flood Insurance 
Promotion, due to the lack of information). See Fig. 1 for a map showing SFHAs 
and Communities Participating in the CRS in 2010.   
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Fig. 1. SFHAs and Communities Participating in the CRS.  
Note: Map of US data used in the analyses. Light gray represents the included tracts with digital FIRM data available. Medium gray indicates Special Flood 
Hazard Areas. Tracts inside black boundaries were in CRS-participating communities in 2010. 
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The second data source is the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) from Geolytics, 
Inc. The NCDB contains US Census information from 1970 to 2010 at the census tract level, 
normalized to use time-consistent 2010 tract boundaries across all 40 years. The NCDB includes 
variables about both the tract population and its housing stock. The third data source is the 
Spatial Hazard Events and Loss Database for the United States (SHELDUS). SHELDUS 
contains county-level information such as the date of hazard events, locations, fatalities, property 
losses, injuries, etc., for 18 different types of natural hazards, including floods, hurricanes, 
thunderstorms, and tornados. Only flood hazard data are taken from SHELDUS for this analysis.  
Table III. Data sources. 
Data Unit Year Variable 
CRS Participation Place/County 1998-2013 Name of participant community, 
CRS class, credits earned, etc. 
Neighborhood Change 
Database (NCDB) from 
Geolytics, Inc 
Tract 1970-2010 Housing values, vacant housing, 
renters, non-migrants, etc. 
The Spatial Hazard 
Events and Loss 
Database for the United 
States (SHELDUS) 
County 1960-2013 Month, hazard type, damages, 
injuries, fatalities, etc. 
Flood Insurance Rate 
Maps  
Flood zones  Current Base flood elevations, flood zones, 
floodplain boundaries, etc. 
Flood Risk Data from the 
United States Department 
of Transportation (US 
DOT) 
1km x 1km 
raster map, 
converted to 
census tract 
1996 Index value/minimum, maximum, 
mean by tract, etc.1 
 
 
                                                 
1 The USDOT flood risk data are converted from a 1km by 1km grid cell map onto census block groups, taking the 
mean value of the flood risk metric across the cells in each block group. Then, each census tract takes the mean 
value of these block groups’ flood risk value. This mean-mean aggregation function was just one of many 
alternatives tried (e.g., min-max, max-max, max-mean).  While the results vary somewhat, the basic findings are not 
very sensitive to the aggregation choice. The mean-mean approach is used here as it is the most straightforward.  
Other constructions are available upon request.  
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The fourth data source is the most current Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS). FIRMS 
contain information about SFHAs and the risk premium zones for 87% of the United States. This 
information is available from FEMA at the tract level. The fifth data source is flood risk data 
from the United States Department of Transportation (US DOT) (1996). The information 
contained in the flood risk data is of very high resolution (1 km grid cell), and based on a ranking 
of flood risk (on a 0-100 scale).  
 
Table IV. Variables and their Descriptions. 
Variable Description Data Source 
Dependent 
Median family income Log of median family income  US Census (Geolytics) 
Poverty rate Share of tract population below the 
federal poverty level last year 
US Census (Geolytics) 
Top earners Percent of population with income in 
the highest census bin  
US Census (Geolytics) 
GINI Gini coefficient US Census (Geolytics) 
Independent 
CRS Dummy variable indicating tract 
resides in a community participating 
in the CRS 
FEMA (2013) 
Flood risk Flood hazard risk, mean flood risk for 
the tract based on 1km by 1km grid 
cells 
US DOT (1996) 
CRS*Risk Interaction between CRS and flood 
risk 
FEMA (2013) and US 
DOT (1996) 
SFHA share Share of a tract in a Special Flood 
Hazard Area (i.e., 100-year 
floodplain) 
FEMA (2013) 
CRS*SFHA Interaction between CRS and SFHA 
share 
FEMA (2013) 
Control Variable 
Property damage Total flood damage over previous 5 
years, per capita, adjusted to 2013 
dollars 
SHELDUS 
Poverty rate Tract poverty rate (10-year lag) US Census (Geolytics) 
Mean housing value Log of mean housing value (10-year 
lag) 
US Census (Geolytics) 
Population density Total tract population divided by total 
land area (10-year lag) 
US Census (Geolytics) 
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County non-migrants Proportion of households in the same 
county 5 years prior (10-year lag) 
US Census (Geolytics) 
Unemployment rate Number of unemployed divided by 
total number in the labor force (10-
year lag) 
US Census (Geolytics) 
Renters Share of total housing units that are 
renter occupied (10-year lag) 
US Census (Geolytics) 
Vacancy Share of total housing units that are 
vacant (10-year lag) 
US Census (Geolytics) 
 
 
4.1.1. Dependent Variable 
 
The analysis considers four distinct dependent variables in separate models (see Table 
IV), but with the same basic model specification. These variables offer alternative ways to 
characterize the tract income distribution. The middle, bottom, and the top of the income 
distribution are captured by the (log) median family income, poverty rate, and the share of the 
population in the highest income bin in the Census, respectively. The top-coded income bin 
captures the highest earning 1-5% of households depending on the Census year. The fourth 
income measure, the Gini coefficient, characterizes the income inequality within the tract for a 
given year. The Gini coefficient varies between zero and one, with higher values indicating 
greater inequality. The Gini coefficient is calculated separately for each tract in each census year 
(1980 – 2010) based on the income distribution across the Census income bins, per the robust 
Pareto midpoint estimator described in von Hippel et al.(60) 
4.1.2. Independent Variables 
 
We are interested in three independent variables: CRS participation, flood risk of tracts in 
CRS communities, and the share of tract areas overlapping SFHAs in CRS communities. CRS 
participation is measured as a dichotomous variable. Those participating in the CRS in any 
particular year were coded 1, and those not participating in the CRS were coded 0. Mean flood 
risk for the tract, based on 1km by 1km grid cells, is a time-invariant control that drops out when 
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tract fixed-effects are used. The interaction term between this flood risk measure and the CRS 
indicator variable (CRS*Risk), however, is a time-varying measure. The share of a tract’s area 
within a 100-year floodplain, the alternative flood risk measure, also drops out with tract-level 
fixed effects. Again, the interaction term between SFHA Share and the CRS indicator is time-
varying, and remains in the model.   
While Flood Risk and SFHA Share are alternative ways to measure flood risks, in the 
context of the CRS, their interaction terms take on crucially different meanings. Discounted 
flood insurance premiums in particular apply to properties in SFHAs, making CRS*SFHA a 
tract-level measure of focused benefits of the CRS program. Conversely, controlling for 
CRS*SFHA, the CRS*Risk interaction identifies the effect of flood risk in tracts in CRS-
participating communities, which might not map onto insurance discounts (even among tracts in 
CRS communities, SFHA and Risk correlation is only 0.14). Thus, while the main effect of CRS 
indicates the average effect of CRS participation across the community—regardless of the tract’s 
flood risks—the interaction terms pick up whether CRS participation is different in tracts that are 
more in floodplains or have greater flood risks. 
4.1.3. Control Variables 
We control for the following variables: property damage, poverty rate, mean housing 
value, population density, county non-migrants, unemployment rate, renters, and vacant homes. 
Property damage is measured as the total flood damage over the previous 5 years, per capita, 
adjusted to 2013 dollars. Poverty rate is measured as the 10-year lag of the tract poverty rate. 
Mean housing value is measured as the log of mean housing value for the community (10-year 
lag), while population density is measured as the total tract population divided by the total tract 
land area (10-year lag). We measured county non-migrants as the proportion of persons residing 
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in the same county five years ago (10-year lag). Further, unemployment rate is measured as the 
number of unemployed divided by the total number of people in the labor force (10-year lag). 
Renters is the share of total housing units that are rentals (10-year lag). Finally, Vacancy is 
measured as the share of total housing units that are vacant (10-year lag).  
Posey’s(40) study suggests a potential simultaneity between poverty rate and CRS. Using 
data from the US Census to measure municipalities’ socioeconomic status, and participation in 
the CRS as a proxy for adaptive capacity, Posey(40) found a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between poverty rates and CRS participation in both a national dataset and one of 
New Jersey’s coastal communities. While Posey(40) used poverty rate as an independent variable, 
we use it as a dependent variable. We address this reverse causality issue by using fixed effects 
models and lagging the control variables, as discussed above. The lagged control variables 
reflect socioeconomic conditions of the previous decade, and help to protect against concerns of 
simultaneity bias. The use of lagged values in the model means that the dependent variable 
ranges from 1980 – 2010 (four different censuses). Year fixed effects are also included in the 
model to capture general time trends. 
Table V: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Median Family Income 327,273 10.956 0.428 1.610 12.546 
Poverty rate 276,001 0.112 0.109 0 1 
Top earners 327,231 0.027 0.057 0 1 
GINI 327,231 0.348 0.061 0 0.757 
CRS 327,658 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Flood risk 327,597 41.076 27.466 0 99 
CRS*Risk 327,597 2.959 12.822 0 99 
SFHA share 283,886 0.118 0.190 0 1 
CRS*SFHA 283,886 0.011 0.072 0 1 
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Mean housing value 251,492 11.531 0.744 -6.151 14.490 
Property damage 327,658 71.966 2697.344 0 901,987.6 
Population density 275,432 0.002 0.004 0 0.084 
County non-migrants 327,534 0.588 0.194 0 1 
Unemployment rate 276,001 0.056 0.048 0 1 
Renters 254,862 0.311 0.209 0 2 
Vacant 254,862 0.079 0.084 0 1.5 
 
Table V presents the descriptive statistics for all variables. The mean poverty rate for the 
sample is 11.2%, and 2.7% of the sample are top earners. The average GINI coefficient is about 
0.35, and 7.7% of tracts are in CRS participating communities. Furthermore, average flood risk 
is approximately 41 (on a scale of 0-100), and about 12% of tract areas are in SFHAs. In 
addition, county non-migrants constitute about 59% of the sample, and the average 
unemployment rate is 5.6%. Finally, 31.1% and 7.9% of the sample are renters and vacant 
housing units, respectively.  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Table VI presents the results of four tract-level fixed-effects models. All the models 
employ robust standard errors in addition to tract-level fixed effects. The models have good 
explanatory power, explaining 13.6% to 23.2% of the variation in the dependent variable. With 
regard to median income, the results indicate median income decreases by 2.2% in tracts located 
in CRS participating communities holding all other variables constant. While CRS community 
tracts with no floodplains experience a decline in median family income, that negative effect 
largely disappears for tracts that are 20% in floodplains. Table VI also indicates that, within CRS 
communities, tracts that are mostly within floodplains (SFHA Share > 0.5) would see median 
incomes rise by 3% or more as SFHA Share grows. Thus, we immediately see a differential 
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effect of the CRS on median incomes in a CRS participating community: incomes are lower 
around the community except near floodplains, where median incomes rise. In addition, the 
relationship between median income and high flood-risk tracts in CRS communities is positive 
and insignificant. 
The results of the poverty rate model (column 2) show the corresponding results for the 
bottom of the income distribution. Specifically, poverty rate is higher by almost a full percentage 
point in CRS participating communities in comparison to non-CRS participating communities, 
holding all other variables constant. Conversely, for CRS tracts, higher floodplain shares 
decrease poverty rates. The net effect of CRS participation on poverty rates is roughly positive 
for tracts until they are mostly in floodplains, and then it turns negative.  The relationship 
between poverty rate and CRS*Risk is negative, and again, insignificant. 
 
Table VI. Fixed-Effects Model Results for Median Income, Poverty Rate, Top Earners, and 
Gini. 
Variable 
Median 
Income 
Poverty 
Rate 
Top 
Earners 
GINI 
CRS -0.022*** 0.008*** 0.001* 0.005*** 
CRS*Risk 0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00003* -0.00003* 
CRS*SFHA 0.103*** -0.018*** 0.007*** -0.016*** 
Property Damage  -1.784 0.237 0.058 2.040** 
Poverty Rate -0.459*** 0.082*** -0.021*** 0.018*** 
Mean Housing Value (log) 0.076*** -0.012*** 0.014*** -0.002*** 
Population Density -12.087*** 2.289*** -0.769*** 0.701*** 
County Non-migrants -0.042*** -0.003 0.009*** 0.020*** 
Unemployment Rate -0.315*** 0.041*** -0.036*** 0.006 
Renters -0.189*** 0.066*** -0.018*** 0.045*** 
Vacancy 0.039* 0.011** -0.027*** 0.011*** 
Year=1980 -0.120*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.027*** 
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Year=1990 -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.013*** 
Year=2000 0.039*** -0.022*** -0.020*** 0.002*** 
N 216,778 216,884 216,645 216,645 
R-Squared 0.188 0.136 0.232 0.136 
Note: *p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
With respect to the relationship between top earners and the CRS, the results show that 
there is an increase of 0.1 percentage points in top earners in CRS communities relative to non-
CRS communities, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, CRS tracts with a high 
floodplain share and high-risk tracts in CRS communities see an increase and a decrease in the 
share of top earners, respectively. The alternate measures of flood risk appear to be working at 
cross-purposes here. While a CRS tract with no flood risk or overlap with SFHAs may see its 
Top earners grow by 0.1% (even as its median income falls and poverty rate rises), a CRS tract 
with 30% in a floodplain and a mean flood risk score of 0 sees that Top earners growth jump 
from 0.1% to 0.3%. Conversely, a CRS tract outside of floodplains but with a mean flood risk 
score of 80 would expect a decline in Top earners of around 0.1%. While small in absolute 
value, the median Top earners value of 0.8% puts into perspective substantial 0.1-0.3 percentage 
point change. Tracts in CRS communities appear to attract top earners, but less so where the 
flood risk is actually greatest and more so in the floodplains where flood insurance premiums are 
discounted. 
Finally, the income inequality model indicates a positive association between the CRS 
and income inequality as the Gini coefficient rises by 0.005, holding all other variables constant. 
Yet, unlike previous models, the flood risk interaction terms appear to complement each other. 
CRS tracts with higher floodplain shares and higher flood risks tend to see a decrease in income 
inequality. Thus, while tracts with no floodplains or flood risk in CRS communities witness 
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increasing income inequality, elsewhere in that CRS community a tract that is 30% in 
floodplains and has a flood risk score of 80 would expect its Gini coefficient to fall by 0.002.   
With regard to the control variables, the results are neither interesting nor surprising. For 
example, property damage is insignificant in all but the income inequality model. According to 
the income inequality model, higher flood damages are associated with CRS tracts with higher 
income inequalities.  
6. DISCUSSION 
Across the income distribution, the results here tell a fairly consistent—if unexpected—
story. Neighborhoods in CRS communities have tended to see their poverty rates and shares of 
residents in the highest income brackets climb while median incomes have fallen. This growth in 
the top and the bottom of the income distribution is relative to tracts in communities not 
participating in the CRS. 
Yet the story becomes more nuanced for those neighborhoods more associated with flood 
risk in CRS communities. In short, the “high ground” neighborhoods in CRS communities are 
seeing more income inequality. Neighborhoods with more floodplains in them, unlike the rest of 
their CRS community, actually see their incomes rise across the distribution (greater median 
income, less poverty, more top-earners) and even declining income inequality. Neighborhoods 
around CRS floodplains attract wealth (or deter poor people from settling there) and possibly 
more income equality. Conditional on SFHA Share, greater Flood Risk for CRS neighborhoods 
is not significantly related to changes in the income distribution at the median or at the lower tail, 
although it does appear to discourage top earners from living there. This effect brings more 
income equality to the neighborhood, relative to other tracts in the U.S. 
The incentives in the CRS program design can account for these interaction effects quite 
easily. As the discounted insurance premiums have greatest effects as CRS*SFHA grows, and 
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may disproportionately affect wealthy property owners,(61) it is not surprising that CRS 
floodplains are attracting more wealth. In fact, some flood-prone areas have experienced 
gentrification. For example, a significant level of gentrification has been observed in New 
Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.(62) Furthermore, other flood management practices 
may also lead to poorer residents relocating elsewhere in the community (e.g., tighter building 
codes raising housing costs). Another mechanism by which poorer residents are moving out of 
the floodplains could be through the implementation of acquisition and relocation (e.g., 
relocating mobile home parks), which is a CRS activity engaged in by 24% of participating 
communities (see Table II).  
The findings here complement the relatively thin literature on the effects of community-
scale flood management programs on income distributions.  Notably, Bagstad et al.’s (2007) 
concerns about perverse subsidies leading to unjust income distributions may not apply to the 
CRS.  Rather, their recommended programs (e.g., tighter building standards, relocation 
assistance, and wetland conservation) are all activities that the CRS can reward.  The resulting 
negative effects (in floodplains) of CRS participation on local Gini coefficients and poverty rates 
points to some favorable results for income inequality consistent with Bagstad et al.(39)  That CRS 
participation also attracts high-income households to floodplains areas is also consistent with 
prior evidence of income-driven new development in flood-prone areas.(34)  Further, the CRS-
discounted insurance premiums are attractive to those purchasing insurance, who tend to be 
wealthier(24), and the wealthier households have greater capacity and propensity to mitigate (e.g., 
Osbergerhaus(35)). 
Similarly, the effect of CRS*Risk on the wealthiest CRS residents, who shy away from 
residing in high flood risk areas suggest that the deterrent effect of CRS flood management effort 
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is working in at least one segment of the income distribution. Wealthier residents are apparently 
responsive to the incentives: take a discount to live in the safer parts of floodplains, but eschew 
high-risk areas, especially if they do not come with discounted premiums. Poorer residents are 
kept out of floodplains, likely receiving more of the “scarecrow” effects of CRS activities (and 
not as much positive incentive) as they disperse elsewhere in the community. 
If the CRS is attracting poverty rather than creating it, then there may be some solace 
taken here. Communities most actively managing their flood risks are also disproportionately 
drawing people in poverty to live there. This may bode well for the “next Hurricane Katrina,” 
and it might reflect the greater capacity of wealthier residents to essentially self-insure against 
flood risks outside of CRS communities. The notion that CRS communities may be pushing 
these new poor residents outside of floodplains is particularly heartening for those concerned 
about protecting vulnerable populations from natural hazard risks. In a sense, the “system” is 
working for the poor, and the wealthiest residents may be finding ways to “game the system” by 
seeking discounts and lower risks. CRS communities may be having more and faster success at 
relocating poor residents away from flood risk than they have for wealthy residents. 
The results have implications beyond just the communities participating in the CRS.  
Insofar as CRS-discounted insurance premiums are consistent with risk-based premiums, the 
results here build on Hudson et al.’s (63) findings that risk-based insurance premiums could 
promote adaptation to flood risk but conflict with affordability.  Thus, the CRS may be 
incentivizing more individual policyholder adaptation while non-CRS communities’ higher 
premiums present an affordability problem where low-income individuals do not insure.  The 
results here suggest that floodplain areas enjoying CRS-discounted premiums also house fewer 
poor residents, which shifts the affordability challenge to flood-prone areas outside the CRS.  A 
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temporary voucher plan for low-income households(64) could address this unaffordability 
concern. 
The results here point to several ways to improve the effectiveness of flood risk 
management efforts in the U.S. The evidence that residents respond to flood risk differently than 
(SFHA) floodplain designations reinforces the value of risk-weighted insurance premiums and 
other more graduated flood management activities. A binary approach that treats things inside 
floodplains equally and mostly ignores things outside official floodplains leaves room for 
improvement, and at least the wealthy residents discern the difference and strategically react.  
Furthermore, even seemingly income-neutral flood risk management can, and does, have 
differential effects across the income distribution. Policymakers may seek to explicitly address or 
reward efforts that target key parts of the income distribution. For instance, the information and 
incentives provided in communities that join the CRS appear to only discourage the wealthy 
from residing in high-risk areas; the poor do not respond to those incentives (perhaps, because 
they do not get the message or get the message, but do not have the resources to relocate from 
high-risk areas). A more effective flood-risk management program could make sure that the 
information and incentives are accessible and actionable across the income distribution.  Finally, 
that joining the CRS is followed by fewer poor and more very wealthy residents in SFHAs may 
be seen as a partial success, but does raise concerns about greater exposure of high-value 
property to flood risks—an unintended consequence of the CRS that is worth managing 
carefully. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of the CRS on 
participating local communities, there is a need to examine both its intended and unintended 
consequences. While the former has been the subject of previous research,(2,8) the latter has yet to 
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be explored despite evidence suggesting that the CRS may have differential impacts on 
communities.(10) To address this research gap, the current study explores how the CRS—a 
program designed to mitigate flood disasters—impacts poverty and income inequality in 
participating CRS communities. The analysis raises and answers some questions about the 
impacts of flood mitigation activities on and across the income distribution. This is especially 
important not just as we assess the fairness of public investments in flood risk management, but 
also because vulnerability to those risks is closely tied to income and household resources.  
Our study is the first to provide empirical evidence on the impacts of the CRS on poverty 
and income inequality. Specifically, the results indicate that median incomes are lower in a CRS 
participating community, but rise in floodplains. Additionally, the results suggest that the CRS 
may be attracting poor people, perhaps as a result of a community’s investments in flood 
management measures as part of the requirements for participating in the CRS. However, once 
poor residents move in, the CRS program seems to be relocating them away from areas that are 
highly prone to flooding. With regard to income inequality, the CRS is attracting top earners 
(perhaps due to the availability of flood insurance premium reductions), including CRS areas that 
are vulnerable to flooding. Finally, the CRS is encouraging income inequality, but discouraging 
income inequality in areas that are highly susceptible to flooding.   
To fully assess the consequences—both intended and unintended—of the CRS, policy 
makers, planners, emergency managers, and those in charge of evaluating the CRS should find 
our results insightful. Our study suggests that the CRS has unintended impacts on poverty and 
income inequality and that these unexpected consequences should be taken into account when 
evaluating the CRS program. By including information on the unintended impacts of the CRS on 
poverty and income inequality, CRS evaluators and other stakeholders would be able to have a 
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holistic understanding of the benefits and costs associated with the CRS. The use of national-
level data allows the results to be more generalizable. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
this study did not control for other variables such as prior flood experience and political 
affiliation.  
Despite this limitation, our study lays the foundation for future work on the unintended 
consequences of the CRS on participating communities. A good understanding of the unexpected 
consequences of the CRS on poverty and income inequality can help policymakers improve the 
overall performance of the CRS, and in particular, its flood risk management piece. Nonetheless, 
further inquiries are urgently warranted. First, it is important for researchers to examine whether 
the CRS, as currently implemented, will be able to reduce flood-related impacts on communities 
in the future amid the growing challenges engendered by climate change. Second, an 
examination of the CRS’s impacts on issues such as migration, housing development, housing 
prices, and building codes merits further investigation. And the distribution of those impacts over 
different subpopulations and income levels, again, deserves special attention. Third, the 
relationship between CRS participation and the type of government deserves attention. For 
instance, does CRS participation depend on whether a local community is governed by a mayor 
or city council? Finally, amid a low CRS participation rate by communities, there is a need to 
study the factors that motivate local communities to participate in the CRS and other voluntary 
federal government risk mitigation programs. This study is a crucial step in helping the risk 
analysis community to better understand the relationship between risk and poverty as well as the 
role of risk analysis in the quest to alleviate poverty and reduce income inequality.  
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